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of all parties. The method by which this relationship operates is co-operation. Piaget hyphenated this word when he wanted to emphasize the etymological root meaning. Cooperating means striving to attain a common goal while coordinating one's own feelings and perspective with a consciousness of another's feelings and perspective. A cooperative teacher considers the child's point of view and encourages the child to consider others' points of view. The motive for cooperation begins in feelings of mutual affection and mutual trust that become elaborated into feelings of sympathy and consciousness of the intentions of self and others.
Cooperation is a social interaction among individuals who regard themselves as equals and treat each other as such. Obviously, children and adults are not equals. However, when an adult is able to respect a child as a person with a right to exercise his or her will, one can speak about a certain psychological equality in the relationship. Piaget was not advocating that children have complete freedom because total freedom without constraint is inconsistent with moral relations with others.
We may extrapolate from Piaget's theory to say that it is clear that external control of children has its limits. Children may conform in behavior, but feelings and beliefs cannot be so easily controlled. As children grow larger physically, the possibility of behavioral control decreases. The only real possibility for influencing children's behavior when they are on their own is to foster their development of moral and intellectual autonomy (see also Kamii, 1982 Kamii, , 1984 .
A child's construction of moral rules begins with learning to follow parental commands. However, these norms must be generalized because commands cannot specify all possible situations. According to Piaget, when children are encouraged to think for themselves and reflect on the moral issues in their lives, they rework commands through differentiation, reinterpretation, and elaboration in the course of lived experiences. An individual who does not do this reworking to construct new and personal norms with a feeling of personal necessity remains susceptible to the vicissitudes of others' opinions and directions. The problem for educators is how to foster a child's real feeling of respect and obligation to follow a norm or rule out of a personal feeling of necessity.
Let us return to Piaget's view of the special benefits of peer interactions for a child's development. In peer relations, it is possible for children to experience an equality that is difficult to achieve in adult-child relations, even when the adult tries to minimize coercion. Reciprocity in peer relations can provide the psychological foundation for perspective-taking (the ability to consider more than one point of view) and decentering (the process by which perspective-taking operates). Children are more easily able to think and act autonomously with other children than with most adults. However, as Piaget (1932 Piaget ( /1965 pointed out, inequalities also exist among children, and autonomy can be violated in child-child interactions.
The Relation Between the Individual and the Social in Affective and Personality Development ment. He spoke about affectivity in a broad sense as the energetic source on which the functioning of intelligence depends, drawing the analogy of affectivity as the fuel that makes the motor of intelligence go. According to Piaget, affectivity is both intrapersonal (need, interest, effort, etc.) and interpersonal (attractions, etc.). In a more specific sense, Piaget took the position that every scheme (psychologically organized action) has both cognitive and affective elements and that these are indissociable.
Piaget argued that children construct schemes of social reaction just as they construct schemes relating to the world of objects. Interest in others leads to voluntary (autonomous) social efforts. A child gradually constructs more and more consistently organized patterns of social actions. As a child acts and reacts in more or less stable ways in similar situations with a variety of people, personality becomes more consolidated and can be observed in consistent patterns. Thus, a child may be viewed as "shy," "friendly," "easily upset," "aggressive," and so forth. Behind these behavior patterns lie the child's interpretations and organizations or schemes of social orientation. Thus, peer interaction as well as adult-child interaction provide raw material out of which a child fashions his or her personality. Following Mead (1934) , Piaget (1932 Piaget ( /1965 1954 emphasized the developing consciousness of the self as a social object that occurs in the course of social interaction. Piaget (1954 Piaget ( /1981 argued that feelings are structured along with the structuring of knowledge and stated that "there is as much construction in the affective domain as there is in the cognitive" (p. 12). This is illustrated by his discussion of the development of affectivity through six sensorimotor cognitive stages.
For Piaget, objects are simultaneously cognitive and affective. For example, an object disappearing behind a screen is at the same time an object of knowledge and a source of interest, amusement, satisfaction, or disappointment to an infant. The ability to think about persons and objects not present makes possible the conservation of feelings, the permanence of values, and the eventual elaboration of a coherent system of moral values. However, in discussing the reconstruction of feelings, Piaget (1954 Piaget ( / 1981 commented that it is not the feeling alone that is conserved, but a certain scheme of interaction with other people. Piaget (1954 Piaget ( /1981 ) referred specifically to the affect of interest as the "fuel" of the constructive process. According to Piaget, interest is central to the mental actions by which a child constructs knowledge and intelligence. Without interest, a child would never make the constructive effort to make sense out of experience. Without interest in what is new, a child would never modify the instrument of reasoning. For Piaget, interest performs a regulatory function, freeing up or stopping the investment of energy in an object, person, or event. As children pursue interests in objects and people, they differentiate these interests. Some objects or aspects are more interesting than others, some are interesting for similar reasons, and the child begins to coordinate interests and thus to construct a hierarchy of personal values-likes and dislikes. The values attributed to others become the point of departure for new feelings, in particular sympathies and antipathies and moral feelings and values.
A system of permanent feelings or values is regulated by what Piaget (1954 Piaget ( /1981 Piaget ( , 1969 Piaget ( /1970 Piaget ( , 1970 ) called "will." In the case of a conflict between values (such as feeling tempted to leave a writing task to go out on a nice day), it is by an affective decentering or will that one revives in oneself the various feelings and values attached to the work. The reconstitution of the feeling can transform the strengths of the conflicting tendencies and subordinate them to values that are permanent and stable. By decentering, the field of comparison is enlarged, and the less stable desire or tendency becomes weaker. Piaget then defined "will" as the power of conservation of values, noting that an individual without will is unstable, believing in certain values at certain moments and forgetting them at other moments. Just as operations serve as regulators of intelligence, enabling the mind to achieve logical coherence, will serves as affective regulator, enabling an individual to achieve stability and coherence in personality and in social relations. Piaget pointed out the necessity of educating the will as a regulator of feelings or values.
The core of affective and personality development, for Piaget, is social reciprocity. This reciprocity is a sort of spontaneous mutual engagement and mutual valuing that involves interindividual feelings. Permanence in values and duration of feelings is made possible only when thought becomes representational. Affect then can persist in the absence, for example, of a person loved. Feeling is conserved in schemes of reaction which, taken together at a later point in development, constitute an individual's character or permanent modes of reactions.
According to Piaget, the progressive differentiation of interests, feelings, and values and the increasing stability and coherence of affectivity are bound up with intellectual development, and both depend on social relations of reciprocity. Piaget (1947 Piaget ( /1966 pointed out that the process of coordinating different points of view and co-operating with others includes all aspects of development. Piaget (1932 Piaget ( /1965 emphasized that ego development necessitates liberation from the thought and will of others (that is, from heteronomy). Lack of this liberation results in inability to co-operate. How does this liberation come about? For Piaget, it is through a child's experience of being respected by an adult who co-operates with the child. Learning to understand others begins as others show that they understand a child's inner feelings and ideas. In this way, Piaget (1932 Piaget ( /1965 ) noted that co-operation is a factor in the creation of personality as a stable ego. Personality is the result of continuous interaction with otherscomparison, opposition, and mutual adjustment. For affective and personality development, as in the development of reasoning and moral judgment, Piaget argued that heteronomous relationships are counterproductive and that co-operative relationships are necessary. For Piaget, therefore, co-operation is an essential characteristic of developmentally oriented education not simply because it is a culturally valued virtue, but because of its psychodynamic developmental significance.
The Relation Between the Individual and the Social in Intellectual Development
In his early work, Piaget (1928 insisted that "there are social elements in logical knowledge" (p. 196), that "social life is a necessary condition for the development of logic" (p. 210), and that "social life transforms the very nature of the individual" (p. 210). He argued that an individual's need for logic arises as a result of contact with opposing ideas of other humans, leading to doubt and a desire to verify. Here we see that Piaget conceived of social factors as having a causal relation to the development of logic. In later work of the 1940s and 1950s, even when Piaget was preoccupied with the construction of cognitive operations, he went further to state that progress in social development and the development of logic "go completely hand in hand" and "constitute two indissociable aspects of a single reality that is at once social and individual" (1945/1995, p. 145). Thus we see in his general statements a deep regard for social factors as equal to cognitive factors in child development.
The Identity of Intellectual Operations and Social Co-Operations
Piaget did not stop with general statements about the relation between the individual and the social. He explicitly went on to state unequivocally that individual operations are, in fact, identical with the social operations of co-operations. This is rather an astonishing claim. Let us examine Piaget's argument first by recalling briefly an example of what Piaget meant by individual operations. We will see that Piaget discussed the development of knowledge of objects in the same terms (in italics in the following accounts) in which he discussed development of social co-operations.
Equilibrated cognitive operations. In their well-known studies of the child's construction of quantities, Inhelder (1941/1974 ) examined children's reasoning with regard to matter by deforming one of two equal balls of clay as children observed. They found that young children do not conserve (or maintain the invariance of) the equality relationship between the two quantities but believe in a state of inequality-that one has more or less clay when rolled into a cylinder, flattened into a disk, or divided into several smaller pieces. Nonconservation results from centering on certain perceptions. This results in a child's focusing on and simply comparing the successive states of the transformation. Children who conserve matter know that however the balls are deformed, they must by necessity remain equal in amount. Conservation reflects a decentration from perceptual states by means of mental actions that make possible consideration of the dynamic transformation. Piaget and Inhelder saw this as an extension of qualitative object permanence (knowing that a concealed object still exists) into quantitative conservation (knowing that a quantifiable aspect of an object remains the same). Piaget and his collaborators also studied children's conceptions of length, number, weight, and volume across various transformations. Examination of children's reasoning led Piaget and Inhelder to hypothesize certain individual mental actions or groups of operations (groups of actions that make up a system of relationships) characteristic of conservation reasoning. For substance conservation, these included the two operations of identification (or identity) and reversibility in a grouping or coordination of actions. Identification refers to the child's argument that nothing has been added or taken away. Operational reversibility refers to the realization that every action can be reversed by an opposite and inverse action that cancels out the effect of the first and thus results in a feeling of necessity that conservation must be so. A child's logic obliges him or her to maintain the quantitative invariance. However, neither identification nor the simple imagination of the return to the ball is sufficient for conservation. Piaget referred to the ability to imagine the inverse virtual action of transforming the deformed substance back into a ball as empirical reversibility and not operational reversibility. At a transitional level, children recognize that nothing has been added or subtracted and realize that the return to the ball will bring about a return to equality-while still maintaining that the deformed ball is more or less than the other. In later work, Piaget (1967 Piaget ( /1971 [i]n the realm of knowledge, it seems obvious that individual operations of the intelligence and operations making for exchanges in cognitive co-operation are one and the same thing, the "general coordination of actions" to which we have continually referred being an interindividual as well as an intraindividual coordination because such "actions" can be collective as well as executed by individuals. (p. 360) Piaget (1950 remarked that "each progress in logic is equivalent, in a non-dissociable way, to a progress in the socialization of thought" (p. 85). He stated that it is not possible to say which is cause and which is effect in the circular (later called "spiral") process of the development of individual logic and the development of co-operation. Further, Piaget (1950 stated that "the isolated individual would never be capable of complete conservation and reversibility" (p. 94).
One way Piaget (1941 Piaget ( , 1945 Piaget ( , 1950 talked about the identity of operations and co-operations was to describe the grouping of operations in social exchanges, using the language of formal logic. Unfortunately, 
agreement lie certain potentials or virtual actions. That is, by accepting Latoya's proposal, Jim feels an obligation (Piaget calls it a kind of "debt") to act toward Latoya as if she is the mommy. This is expressed in the term t(x'). He therefore has the possibility to conserve the agreement and establish the future potential (or virtual action) for respecting this role consistently (with non-contradiction) in subsequent play. This conservation is expressed in the equality s(x') = t(x').
That is, the idea validated by Jim is the same as the idea to which he feels obligated, and he therefore will not contradict himself. Because of Jim's conservation of the agreement, the virtual action implied in Jim's conservation gives Latoya a kind of "credit" that she can "cash in" by calling on Jim (in the near future at least) to act on his feeling of obligation to his conserved idea. The term v(x) indicates the future validity of r(x). This virtual action is expressed in the term v(x), and we have the new equality, t(x') = v(x). Jim's current feeling of obligation, t(x'), is projected into the future through its conservation. The equality v(x) = r(x) expresses the fact that Latoya has the future possibility to expect of herself what she also expects of Jim. The idea to which the partners agree becomes also a virtual action, the idea to which they feel obligated in the future. This implies that Latoya has the potential to conserve her own original idea to be the mommy, expressed in the identity r(x) = r(x). Then let us say that, as shown in r(x) = s(x') = t(x') = v(x) = r(x') = s(x) = t(x) = v(x'). (Piaget, 1950 Imbedded in these equalities are reciprocities. We can say there is reciprocity between the children's ideas so that r(x) = r(x'), s(x) = s(x'), etc. Thus we have identities, complementarities, correspondences, coordinations, conservations, and reversibilities, all characteristics of individual operations, in a stable or equilibrated exchange of co-operations. Both partners feel obliged to refer constantly to the past to bring present and previous propositions into agreement, reflecting a kind of reversibility. Past and present ideas are coordinated across time according to transformations in elaborations that maintain the general agreement. The feeling of obligation to conserve an idea agreed upon does not remain static but is dynamic (in our example, the theme is elaborated). This dynamic conservation makes possible reversible coherence in the system of interactions. The equalities refer to coordinations in understanding, agreement, and valuation. Reciprocities are seen in the fact that the interaction is a series of propositions that complete foregoing propositions. Also, the rule of reciprocity is seen in the fact that both partners can call on each other to act according to the proposition agreed upon. Reciprocity in feelings of mutual valuing (mutual respect) and mutual feelings of obligation are present as long as the partners honor their mutual agreement. The agreements are in one-to-one correspondence as they match the general theme of interaction. When in an actual exchange conservation occurs so that the partners do not contradict themselves and continue to recognize and understand the other's point of view, the exchange is in equilibrium and can be said to be a system of co-operations.
We can say that to the extent that Jim and Latoya maintain an equilibrated exchange, their agreement has future validity and becomes a permanent value in their relationship. Implicit in this exchange is the mutual valuing of partners. When the potentialities are realized in play, the experience leads Jim and Latoya to value each other as "good pretenders" or "fun to play with," indication of successful reciprocity in the relationship from the children's viewpoints.
In the example given above, the children are bound to an equilibrated exchange only by their spontaneous feelings and converging interests and desires. The conservations are not obligatory according to moral or legal rules held by the co-exchangers. Thus the equilibrium is delicate and impermanent. Piaget pointed out that many inequalities are possible in interpersonal exchanges so that disequilibrium can occur, perhaps more often than equilibrium. In response to Latoya's overture, Jim might ignore her or assert a contradictory proposal. He might not share her language or understand her proposal. Or her action may result in a negative satisfaction (for example, if she hurts Jim in some way). In these cases, r(x) ? s(x'). Jim may forget, get distracted, or change his mind so that the initial feeling of satisfaction is not conserved in the feeling of obligation-that is, s(x') ? t(x'). Partial or approximate conservations are possible. A partner may abandon the agreed-upon role and propose a new theme, in which case the equilibrium vanishes and negotiation begins anew. To the extent that exchanges are based on fleeting interests with temporary "equilibria," Piaget characterized these as regulations that do not achieve co-operations. Yet regulations in Piaget's (1967/1971) theory eventually evolve into operations and are therefore significant reflections of progress in development. It is easy to imagine interactions devoid even of regulatigns (for example, parallel monologues).
While the exchanges of young children cannot be said to be fully equilibrated permanent operations, pre-operational efforts to co-operate with others foreshadow later operations, just as children's pre-operational efforts to compare numbers in the card game War foreshadow later operational understanding of number. Operations and co-operations occur, according to Piaget, at the stage of concrete operations at the approximate age of 7 or 8 years and progress to a wider and more coherent field of application at the stage of formal operations at the approximate age of 11 or 12 years.
Teacher-child interactions. Piaget connected his later formal theory of co-operations to points made earlier in The Moral Judgment of the Child (Piaget, 1932 (Piaget, /1965 ) (summarized, in part, above), arguing that operational development depends on relations of cooperation in contrast to relations of constraint that tend to lead only to a system of regulations, not operations. The obligation in a relation of unilateral respect is one-sided (that is, non-reciprocal and disequilibrated) when the adult does not feel obligated to respect the child by accepting the child's propositions/beliefs. Piaget pointed out three possibilities as a result of an adult exercising coercion over a child to transmit readymade truths and values. One possibility is that the partners may simply think in their own ways with no agreement and a disequilibrated exchange. In Piaget's terms, r(x) ? s(x'). This may be due to a young child's egocentric point of view that prevents him or her from understanding an adult's meaning and from achieving shared, reciprocal propositions. Let us take the example of adult efforts to teach a child to take turns in a game. If the child does not understand the necessity of turn-taking reciprocity for fairness, the child can only experience the rule to take turns as arbitrary. It is thus common to observe children between the ages of three and five years taking two or more turns without giving the partner a turn or "taking turns" simultaneously.
The second possible result of coercive adult imposition is that a child may agree with an adult because of the adult's authority or prestige. A lack of reciprocity in the relationship will exist when the child does not agree with the proposition for the same reason as the adult. That is, the child does not truly validate the adult's proposition, and r(x) ? s(x'). The child also may not even think whether he or she agrees with the adult's proposition, but may simply agree to be compliant, also an instance of inequality in the relationship.
Consider the example of an adult trying to teach a child to count correctly in a path game in which players take turns rolling a die and moving accordingly from start to finish. A common error among four-and five-year-olds is to count as "one" the space on which they landed on the previous move. The child's "logic" that it is necessary to acknowledge the starting space is at a certain moment in development very firmly held. This is what I call a "logical error of addition" due to the child's failure to see the moves along the path as a series of additions.
When A third possible result of an adult's effort to teach by constraint is that a child becomes personally convinced through his or her own reasoning of the validity of the adult's proposition in spite of the adult's coercive attitude.
The child manages to go around the coercion, so to speak, to construct the system of understandings, agreeing, for example, with the necessity of taking turns for reasons related to the desire for equality and the reciprocity of fair play. Egalitarian peer interactions may enable autonomous constructions in the absence of adult cooperation. As a result, the child feels obligated to follow this self-constructed rule and then values the adult's commitment to the same rule. In this case, we have an equilibrated exchange. Figure 4 shows an equilibrated exchange between teacher and child when the teacher proposes the idea, "Would you like to play Go Fish?" Latoya shows she agrees and validates the teacher's idea by beginning to deal the cards, r(x) = s(x'). If Latoya and the teacher share a common understanding of the rules, Latoya's agreement includes an agreement to play by the rules. Latoya has the potential to conserve her agreement by feeling obligated to observe the shared system of rules, t(x'). Because of Latoya's conservation, the teacher has the potential to call on her to follow the rules, and t(x') = v(x). The teacher then has the potential to expect of herself what she expects of Latoya, v(x) = r(x), implying that the teacher has the potential to conserve her own original idea, r(x) = r(x).
We thus see how Piaget considered interpersonal exchanges as constituting a logic that is identical with individual logic in cognitive operations. Operational and cooperational development therefore occur in the same way, In 1968, Piaget introduced the concept of qualitative identity as occurring earlier than quantitative conservation. Identity is a kind of qualitative invariance seen in the conservation of substance experiment when children understand that the clay in the cylinder is the "same clay" as it was when it was a ball. Other qualitative invariants studied by Piaget (1968) include the identity of a wire through various deformations, of the child's own body through growth over time, and of a seaweed-like growth that develops before the child's eyes (a grain of potassium ferrocyanide placed in a solution of copper sulfate and water). Another example of invariant qualitative identity is a belief in the generic identity of a cat across transformations into a "dog" and "rabbit" via realistic masks (DeVries, 1969).
According to Piaget, identity is pre-operational and occurs even as early as the end of the sensorimotor period (about two years). In fact, Piaget (1968) corrected his earlier reference to object permanence (understanding that a hidden object continues to exist) as "a first form of conservation" and said that this should be called "identity" because it is not quantitative (p. 20). While identity is prelogical, Piaget (1968) drew attention to its partial coordinations that lack reversibility but that "sketch out future operations" (p. 22). According to Piaget, conservation does not directly derive from identity, however, but identity (as it evolves) is one element of the system of operational structures that makes quantitative conservation possible.
Stambak and Sinclair (1990/1993), in their studies of pretend play among three-year-olds, call attention to the fact that children of this age conserve personal identity when they abandon an assumed role to make non-pretense remarks and comments about the organization of the play. Children thus show an awareness of the duality of their pretend and real identities. Similarly, children can give symbolic meaning to an object but also return it to its normal use from time to time. Stambak and Sinclair comment that "A certain kind of reversibility can thus already be observed at an early age in pretend play" (p. xvii). This ability to conserve an identity while taking on another reflects a mobility of thought that, if not the same as the reversible operation in quantitative conservation, may be a precursor or foreshadowing of the reversibility seen in quantitative conservations. Stambak and Sinclair (1990/1993) suggest "the hypothesis of a positive influence of duality in pretend play on the elaboration of operatory thought" (p. xvii). They also suggest that
[s]ocial interaction and especially peer interaction thus seem, at a far earlier age than is generally supposed, to prepare the principal characteristics of the main reasoning principles brought to light by Piaget with reference to the ages of 6 or 7 .... The negotiations, justifications, and proposals of compromise observed show that at the age of our subjects the correspondences and reciprocities that, according to Piaget (1948 Piaget ( /1959 Did Piaget reduce the social to the cognitive? This question, raised by an anonymous reviewer, also entails the issue of whether one happens prior to the other. Actually, it could just as well be said that Piaget reduced the cognitive to the social. In contrast to both of these reductive ideas, he clearly stated that cognitive development is as much due to social experiences as social relations and development are due to cognition, and that "decentration of values ... cannot be reduced to cognitive decentration" (Piaget, 1954/1981, p. 64) . However, it is true, as described above, that Piaget was not interested in explaining interactional processes beyond their general structure and function. He did not study the dynamics of social interaction. Moreover, he did analyze social interactions in terms of the same processes he saw in individual cognitive development. It is true that Piaget saw parallels between his developmental levels in logical structuring and modes of social interaction, but without assigning either a causal role in relation to the other. Piaget (1950 himself raised the question, "Must we conclude that it is the logical or prelogical structuration of a level which determines the corresponding mode of social collaboration, or that it is the structure of the interactions which determines the nature of intellectual operations?" (p. 87). He answered his question in the following way:
Here, the notion of operatory groupings helps to simplify this apparently unanswerable question: it is sufficient to specify, for a given level, the exact form of the exchanges between individuals, to see that these interactions are themselves constituted by actions, and that cooperation itself consists in a system of operations in such a way that the activities of the subject acting on objects, and the activities of subjects when they interact with each other are reducible in reality to one and the same overarching system, in which the social aspect and the logical aspect are inseparable, both in form and content. (Piaget, 1950 It is difficult, however, to accept the latter part of this statement, that the social and logical are the same in content. While it is clear from the discussion above how the logical and the social may be viewed as the same in form, it is not clear in what way they are the same in content. Piaget defined the content of co-operations to be values. The content of the logical would be specific knowledge. These seem to be different rather than the same in content.
While Piaget emphasized the identity of individual operations and co-operations, he, like Vygotsky, seemed at times to lean in the direction of the priority of the social. He noted that the symbolism of individual images fluctuates too much to account for conservation, reversibility, and equilibrium, leading to the necessity of the social factor. He went on to declare that [w]hat is more, the objectivity and coherence necessary for an operatory system presuppose cooperation. In short, then, in order to make the individual capable of constructing groupements, it is first necessary to attribute to him all of the qualities of a socialized person. (Piaget, 1945 
. 154).
Piaget (1945/1995) further argued that "only the equilibrated exchange will lead to the formation of operatory thought" (p. 148) because this is already composed of groupings, as described above.
While it seems clear that Piaget did not reduce the social to the cognitive, it also has been pointed out by Chapman (1992) that Piaget underestimated the importance of the social dimension in the construction of knowledge. Chapman felt that Piaget "did not explain how . .. intersubjective equilibration was related to subject-object and intrasubjective forms of equilibration" (p. 53). Piaget could not provide this explanation because he did not study systematically relations between individual operations and social co-operations. Furthermore, Piaget did not discuss how culture influences development as he was not interested in individual differences. He (Piaget, 1966 (Piaget, /1974 ) did say that it is necessary to know how differential cultural pressures influence cognitive development in order to dissociate sociocultural from individual factors in development. However, as pointed out by Downs and Liben (1993) , in his cognitive studies, Piaget deliberately tried to "strip away the effects of culture" (p. 179). They also comment that Piaget "failed to offer us any insights about how these culturally developed and culturally provided systems have an impact on cognitive development" (p. 179). For some Vygotskians (for example, Cole & Wertsch, 1996) , it is the cultural factor in Vygotsky's theory that most clearly distinguishes this theory from Piaget * Relate to children in co-operative ways. What is unique in the constructivist perspective is Piaget's idea that the teacher should make a special effort to achieve equality in exchanges with children in order to promote operational and co-operational development. A special effort is required because of children's natural heteronomous attitude toward adults. The general principle here is to minimize coercion as much as practical and possible. This attitude leads to an approach to discipline in which the teacher does not do things to children, but works with children (DeVries & Zan, 1994; Kohn, 1996) . * Promote peer friendship and cooperation, including conflict resolution. What is most unique here is the view that conflict and its resolution are part of the curriculum. Conflict resolution is co-operative in Piaget's sense of operating in terms of another person's feelings and ideas. In conflicts, children are especially motivated by the disequilibrium in an interaction to reflect on ways to reestablish reciprocity. Motivation to co-operate in conflict resolution depends on whether children care about the relationship that is in jeopardy. If so, they make the effort to decenter and try to coordinate points of view. Peer friendship is therefore important to children's operational and co-operational development. A teacher's support of the value of mutual agreement is important as is mediational support in helping children develop negotiation strategies.
* Cultivate a feeling of community and the construction of collective values. The co-operative sociomoral atmosphere is not impersonal. It is a network of deeply personal relations that come to be important to everyone. As children find satisfaction in their personal relationships, s(x') or s(x), they develop feelings of obligation, t(x') or t(x), that lead to regulations and co-operations. Central to the constructivist teacher's strategies for fostering community is consultation with children about what happens in the classroom. The co-operative teacher encourages children to make classroom rules that, when conserved by children, become the norms or values by which they live in relation to each other. When children make the rules, they are more likely to understand and feel obligated to follow them than if rules are given ready-made by a teacher. When rules are broken, children discover the natural consequences of nonconservation of values. Decision making and voting are regular experiences for children in constructivist classrooms. While children obviously should not make all decisions in the classroom, the decisions they do make should be about issues meaningful to them. Their decisions should be more significant than how to decorate the gym for a sock hop. In constructivist classrooms, teachers and children discuss social and moral issues and moral dilemmas in literature and in life in school.
Group games offer children an excellent opportunity to submit voluntarily to a system of rules in a limited context that nevertheless challenge children to make mutual agreements, feel obligated to the partner to abide by these, and accept the consequences of the rules. Game competition can thus be viewed within a broader framework of cooperation (DeVries & Kohlberg, 1987/1990; Kamii & DeVries, 1980) . Game play may be more or less equilibrated, depending on children's intercoordinations. A teacher can encourage children to conserve their practice of rules. In games, children have the possibility to discover that when they are inconsistent in following rules, a partner may protest, and they find out the disadvantages of a breakdown in reciprocity. They may then discover the advantages of playing by the same rules when the partner accepts the consequences of playing by the rules agreed upon. While four-year-olds are challenged by the need to construct the logic of turn-taking and a specific set of rules, older children are challenged by the need to construct strategies and to coordinate with another within more complex systems of rules. In games, children have possibilities for the confrontation of different points of view that Piaget (1932 Piaget ( /1965 considered important for the elaboration of logical thought. * Appeal to children's interests and engage their purposes.
Providing activities that appeal to children's interests is one expression of respect for the child's point of view but also reflects respect for how children learn and develop their intelligence. General interest in an activity gives the teacher an opportunity to challenge children to pursue a specific purpose. If Piaget was correct, it follows that we must help children find their purposes in activities. For Piaget, genuine experimentation and "authentic work" are salient characteristics of the active education he advocated. He noted:
[w]hen the active school requires that the student's effort should come from the student himself instead of being imposed, and that his intelligence should undertake authentic work instead of accepting pre-digested knowledge from outside, it is therefore simply asking that the laws of all intelligence should be respected. (Piaget, 1969 (Piaget, /1970 One powerful way to engage children's interests and purposes is to consult with them about the content of the curriculum. When the teacher makes a list of children's ideas about what to learn, she can then conserve these ideas by organizing the curriculum around them. Children then experience the teacher's conservation of their own ideas, the feeling of obligation on the part of the teacher to these, and the resulting reciprocity. A clever teacher can integrate math and literacy and all other subject matters into what children genuinely want to know about. This does not mean that district curriculum is ignored or that the teacher brings no suggestions, but that he or she does so with the aim to engage children's real interests and purposes. Where content is fixed by district mandates, a teacher can consult children about how to go about their study together.
Providing for a wide range of individual and collective interests does not mean there are no "have tos" in a constructivist classroom, but these, too, can be managed in ways that minimize coercion. For example, in one second grade, the teacher asked children to read with a friend for about 15 minutes sometime during the day. When to read and what and with whom were left to the children. She thus gave children the opportunity for autonomy within an assigned task. Similarly, because the school district mandated use of handwriting worksheets, the teacher explained where the requirement came from and that it was intended to help children write more legibly. However, children had the opportunity to decide when during the week to do the worksheets (for example, one every day or five on Friday) and to evaluate their work with the teacher. Duties understood and accepted within a general atmosphere of mutual respect do not damage that atmosphere.
SAdapt to children's understanding. If Piaget was correct, then one way the teacher must co-operate with children is to take account of their knowledge and ways of knowing. This can be accomplished in at least four ways.
First, learn how children are already reasoning about a topic. This does not mean just finding out what children do not know. In fact, children already know a lot about most curriculum topics. Usually, however, they are incorrect in many of their spontaneous ideas about the abstract aspects of these topics.
Second, honor children's ideas, respect their reasoning, and support the search for truth. For example, in a water activity in which a child suggests that all little things float, the teacher can respect this idea by giving it the credence of deserving to be explored. If the teacher says, "Let's try a bunch of little things to see if that works," this creates a moment of interindividual equilibrium that permits the child to experiment and find out the truth by his or her own action.
Third, consider the kind of knowledge involved. In numerous places, Piaget (for example, 1970) distinguished between physical and logico-mathematical knowledge. Briefly, physical knowledge is based on experiences of acting on objects and observing their reactions. The source of physical knowledge is therefore partly in the object's potential for reaction in certain ways. In contrast, logicomathematical knowledge is the result of reflective mental actions on objects that introduce characteristics that objects do not have into an individual's ideas about those objects. It is a system of relationships created by the knower. (For example, the "twoness" of a book and a cup does not exist in either object but in the mind of the knower who gives the objects this numerical characteristic.) The source of logico-mathematical knowledge is therefore the knower's own constructive processes. Logico-mathematical knowledge is particularly important because intelligence, according to Piaget, can be described as a framework of potential logico-mathematical relationships.
A third kind of knowledge, conventional arbitrary knowledge, is arbitrary truth agreed upon by convention (such as that December 25th is Christmas Day in many countries) and rules agreed upon by coordination of points of view (such as the rule that cars should stop when a traffic light is red). The source of arbitrary conventional knowledge is other people, through various means of communication, including books and computers.
Having made these distinctions, Piaget quickly pointed out that it is difficult to conceive of pure physical or conventional knowledge. Virtually all knowledge involves logico-mathematical construction. For example, while the fact that Houston is the name of a city in Texas is conventional knowledge, the spatial and logical inclusion of Houston in Texas is logico-mathematical. (A five-year-old seated next to me on an airplane flying from Texas to California asked me, "Is Houston by Texas?" indicating the lack of inclusion.) These distinctions are important to constructivist teachers because they provide a framework for planning and implementing activities. If the knowledge the teacher wants to teach is mainly physical in nature, then the teacher encourages children to act on objects to find out their properties. If the knowledge is mainly conventional in nature, the teacher simply teaches through direct instruction by telling children the arbitrary fact. In the respect that knowledge is logico-mathematical in nature, then the teacher must engage children in reflecting on situations and problems that challenge their incorrect con- 
